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INTRODUCTION
In support of the goverm_ent_s agricultural development objective
to develop import substitutes, the national cotton development prog-
ram, which paved the way for the commercial-scale reintroduction of
cotton in Philippine agriculture 2, was formally launched in the early
1970s. Rationale given to the program were (i) the country has
been importinE its cotton lint requirement which_ over a ten-year
period (1966-75), inv,!red an average annual outflow of $30 million;
and (2) research studies have shown that cotton can be grown in suit-
able areas of the country with a profitable rate of return.
More than 530,000 hectares have been delineated as potential
areas technically suitable for cotton cultivation and about 150,000
hectares of this fall into the existing cropping systems. The latter
represents more tha_ the required hectarage of i15,000 in order for
the country to be self-sufficient in its raw cotton bonsumpEion. As
IResearch intern, Resource Systems Institute, East-West Center,
Honolulu, Hawaii, and Science Research Specialist (on leave), Cotton
Research and Development institute, Philippines. This paper is based
on the author's MS Thesis (Balisacan, 1982) and is part of the pro-
ject entitled "The Impact of Economic Policies on Philippine Agricul-
tural Development" funded by the Philippine Institute and Development
Studies and Philippine Council for Agricultural and Resources Research
and Development".
2pioneering attempts to co_=_ercialize cotton cultivation in the
country were made as early as pro-Second World War. However, in-
adequate technical know-how, coupled with managerial and acute
financial problems led to the abandonment of operations.of crop year 1950~g_ about 17,000 hectares of these have been
planted to cotton a qumttum ju_l_ from a modest 194-hectare , . ... • _-. '...
beginning in crop year 1974-75,
As expected_ the p_omot_u of cotton raises t,._o crucial eco-
DE_ic Iss_es_ First:_.how economically competitive is t_e domes-
tically produced cotton with respect to imported cotton_ i.e.
does the ¢c,_.'omy have a ¢ompaxative advantage in domestic cotton
pr_oduction? _nd second_ has the matrix of _overnmant policies
encouraged., domes tic cotton production?
This-;_a_er _attempts_ to a_S_er these _o questions. The firs_
section describes the historical de_e!oDment_ trends in production
and imports, and policies :affecting the cotton industry. In the
next section_ the effects of gove_nment policies on the structure
of economic inceu_ive$ in the cotton ind.ustml is analys.e.d. Lastly,
in the third section, the issue of the relative economic efficiency
of domestic cotton production is. co.%apreherusivelyexplored.
I. I_mUSTR¥ BAC_"ROL_D
Historical Profile
The Philippine cotton industry dates .as far back as the pre-
Hispanic era. Throu_=hout the lan_, hOl_Sehold weaviu_ flourished,
• and '"lompotes;_ a native fabric mad_ ef ,cottonp wa_ a renowned
...., ,.
export product of Filipino ancestors to (,_ina omdother parts of.
Zhe gl.05e. _ne fibers we=_ extracted from perennial_ty_e COttOn
plants known now today, as wild-glzowin;i"nayiv_ _otton p!181_tS. ,3
_._iththe transfer of the center of trade from Cebu to Manila
during the Span&sh regime, the local industry began to crumble.
cheaper and higher-quality imported faSrics manufacture by The
English mills competed with the loca_.ly woven fabrics. This
proved to be a sharp blow to the local weaving industry. In a
short time, "iompotas" ceased to be a major batter commodity for
Chinese goods, the locally grown varieties became mere backyard
crops, and the local cotton industry dwindled.
The establishment of the National Land Settlement Administra-
tion in 1939 led to the revival of cotton cultivation. NLSA, the
first agency in the country to attempt to grow cotton on a commer-
cial scale, started a modest 100-hectare cotton cul_iva_ion in
that year. The undertak/ng, however, was cut short by the Japanese
occupation of the country duz.i_g the Second World War_
A post-war era in the Philippine co,ton industry began with
_ha organization of the N_tioual Development Company in 1953 and
the Philippine Cotton Agricultural Corporation in 1955, the latter
renamed as the General Agricultural Corporation in 1956. Concen-
trating operations in Mindanao where prospects of co_ton cultivation
looked good, bo_h agencies established a modern mechanized all-cotton
having hundreds of laborer8 and planting &_ annual average of
nearly 1,000 hectares.
Results of _he undertaking, unfortunately, were rather dis=
couraging. Overall average seeucotton3yi_d_ after e_g_ cropping
3The produc_ consisting of fibers and seeds, picked from cotton
plants.4
years, was o_.iy 326kg/ha, with the lowest registered at 85kg/ha.
Teclmical inadequately, complicated by acute financial difficulty
and organization_l and operational conflict_ within the company
lad to the discontinuation of operations.
A turning point in the Philippine cotton industry came in
the late sixties and early seventies. At this time, cotton lint
prices in the world market began to soar after a long declining
trend from the fifties to the early sixties. As a result, the
country's textile millers who bore the Brunt of the increasing
cost of cotton imports agitetated for the development of the local
cotton industry. In re.sponse_ the government enacted a series of
!egislations,.the first of which was the passage of Republic Act
4986 creating the Philippine Textile Research Institute PTRI, a
joint venture with the private sector, was mandated to promote the
development of the country's textile industry.
In 1969, the Burean of Plant Industry, throuRh a research.
gran_ _romPTRi_ took special in_erest in the launching of a cotton
research project which gave special attention to the development of
a cotton variety that best fits the climatic and topograFhical con-
ditions of the country. Kesults of its studies showed Deltapinee
16, an American upland medium-staple variety, to be the best in
terms of yield and adapatibility.
Almost in the same year_ Central Luzon State University, through
a similar grant from PTRi, assumed the important role of undertaking
a vigorous technical research program om cotton cultivation. Its5
research efforts turned out to be successful and the encouraging
results led to the launching of a pioneering project called "Opera-
tion Bulak", an on-farm production program with operations concen-
trated in Central Pangasiann, in 1972. This project sought to
reintroduce cotton growing into farmers' cropping systems,
The outstanding performance of "Operation Bulak _'immediately
drew national attention. Thus, in 1973, the project culminated
with the signing of Presidential Decree 350, later amended by
PD 1063, creating the Philippine Cotton Corporation (PCC) as the
central authority to undertake, implement, and supervise commercial
scale-cotton production in the country. A semi-government cont_io_led
corporation attached to the Ministry of Agriculture, PCC is a joint
venture between the government and the private sector.
TO support the national cotton development program formally
launched in crop year 1977-78 after three years of pilot operations_
the Philippine government, by virtue of PD 1432, created the Cotton
Reeearch and Development Institute in June 1978. The Institutels
assigned the task of stren=he_ing and accelerating current efforts
in the specialized areas of cotton research and development in order
tO support the national objectives of attaining self-sufficiency in
cotton in the shortest time possible.
The Domestic Raw Cotton Scenario
_tion. There are over 20 cotton textile millers presently
operating in the country. Over the past year, the magnitude of theirdemand is reflected in the country's .important of cotton lint
(equivalently referred to as raw cotton.) which represented the
total supply before'f975.
Raw cotton imports over the last two decades, though marked
by inter-year fluctuations, generally showed a declining trend
(Figure l). The annual average quantity of imports dropped by
i5 percent in the ensuin_decade despite the c6unt%7's significant
increase in per capital income and population. Partly, this pheno-
menon was due to the intense competition that developed between
cotton and man-made or synthesis fibers, In terms of _mport value
however, raw cotton importation in the seventies rose si_ninficantly
reaching $47 million in 1978, This resulted largely fram
a more than twofold jump im world cotton prices between the two
decades.
The observed inter-year fluctuations in the volume of raw
cotton imports, in the late sixties and early seventies can be
related to the textiles industry's principal problem during this
period_ The textile firms were then suffer_n_ from low capacity
utilization (60 percent) primarily because of low domestic and
world demands for their products (Morales, 1974), Presumably, this
was the reason why the Fiscal Policy Committee of the Board of
Investment placed the textile industry in the category of over-
crowded industries in 1970. The sudden increase in _mportation
in 1973 could be a_tributed to the deletion of the industry from7
the same list of congested industries by the BOI in 1972. This
in effect_ lifted the restrictions on expansion of facilities end
other disincentives (e.g., imports of machineries and equipments)
imposed on the firms prior to 1972.
For the past decades, raw cotton imports originated mainly
from the United States (Table i). This was especially so during
the 1971-75 period when practically all cotton imports were pro-
vided to the Philippine textile industry via the agreement between
4
the US through its Public La_ 480 and the Philippine government.
Domestic production. Though cou_ercial-scale cotton product-
ion in the country was pursued in the fifties and early sixties as
mentioned earlier, the efforts and scale were not intensive as in
the second half of the seventies and early eighties when the nation-
al cotton development program was pursued with full support from
both the government and the private sectors. During this latter
period_ domestically produced raw cotton began to fill a signifi-
cant fraction of the domestic supply. From a modest 0.3. percent
share of production to supply in 1975, the proportion jumped to
13.6 percent at the beginning of the eighties (Table 2). With
imports remaining almost at the same level during the late seven-
ties and early eighties, this increase in proportion is attributed
4The iaw's primary purpose was to support American agriculture_
while at the same time assisting the economic development of friendly
nations through the utilization of America_s surplus of agricultural
commodities via provision of long-term credit for the purchase of
such surplus crops. USDA's Counnodity Credit Corporation financed
the sale and exportation of these commodities.8
almost entirely to domestic production which_ during the same
period, registered an annual growth rate of about i00 percent.
Interfiber competition. The introduction and development of
man-made or synthetic fibers in the fifties ushered in a new era
in the cotton industry. With the market for man-made fibers
largely concentrated in apparel and elastomer industries, a stern
competition developed between natural and synthetic fibers.
The competitiveness of cotton vis-a vis man-made fibers can
be sleaned from the relative world price trends and local fiber
consumption. As s_w_ in Figure 2, the price index of nnn-cell
ulosics_ represented _, US polyester staple, decreaead rapidly from
the fifties down to the early seventies. Cotton prices, howevers
began to increase markedly in the late sixties, so that by the
early seventie3, the polyester- cotton price ratio had declined
by about 75 percent, compared to 1960-65. This may be part of
the reason that local cotton consumptionp as reflected in the
level of .imports shown earlier, did not consistently increase
during the same period. Local textile mills preferred the rela-
tively cheaper man-made fibers which correspondingly absorbed a
greater proportion of the country's imports of textile fibers
durin8 the sixties and seventies. Also, this phenomenon was con-
siste_t with a steadily declining cotton content on locally pro-
d_ced fabrics-ranging from76 percent in 1963 to 27 percent in
1972 (Table 3).9
The trend in relative world prices of competing fi%ers,
however, changed after 1973. Prices of man-made fibers began to
increase as the price of oil_ upon which synthetics depend
for their raw materials rose sharply during this period. Al-
though cotton prices seem to have risen about as fast_ the
cotton content of locally produced fabrics increased especially
between 1973 and 1975.
Policies, Laws and Related Measures
Affecting the Cotton Industry
The producing sector. As mentioned earlier, the Philippine
Cotton Corporation, created in 1973 by virtue of PD 350, later
amended by PD 1063, is the central authority to undertake,
implement,and supervise commercial=scale cotton cultivation in
the country. Since its inception, PCC has undertaken a broad
ranged of activities, the most critical of which are: the select-
ion of general areas for cotton growing the provision of neces-
sary financial and agricultural extension s_r¢ices$ and the
puchasing, storing, ginning, baling, and marketing of all cotton
produced under its program.
Seedcotton price is set By PCC at the beginning of the croD-
ping season and farmers are assured of the market for their pro-
duce by the PCC which is the sole buyer and processor of seed-
cotton. PCC, through its lending-arm participating rural and
commercial banks, gents production credit to farmers. LikeI0
other supervised credit programs, cotton production loans carry
an interest rate of I0 percent plus 2 percent service charge°
For the past seven cropping season, the average actual product-
ion loan ranged from _535 to _2,001 per farmer_ or from _i_270
to 22,581 perhectare (Table 4)° Translated into terms of raw
cotton (lint) production, the average loan ranged from _3,773
per metric ton in 1975 to _9_553 per metric ton in 1981o
Payment for farmers' seedcotton produce is channeled by
PCC to the lending banks which in turn deduct the production
loan obtained by farmers before remitting the balance to the
latter. This practice enables the lending banks to have a high
repayment rate for their production loans_ During the 1975-80
period, the repayment averaged 85 percent, which is one o4 the
highest in agricultural production loans of a similar nature.
The textile sector. In the past_ domestic cotton suplly,
as stated earlier, mainly originated from imports, the bulk of
which came from United States through the provision of the agree-
ment between the US (through)its Public Law 480) and the Philip-
pines government. This agreement ceased its effect in 1975, the
same year domestic production started to supply a _odest fraction
of total supply° Quantitative regulation by the government through
a licensing system, however, was in effect - and is still presently
imposed - on imported raw cotton. Under the system, the Development
Bank of the Philippines allows imports of cotton by textile mills only
after the domestically producedii
cntton has been allocated among these= mills° If the textile
mills' request to import is granted, DBP enters their request
and endorses the application of qualified importers to Central
Bank, which are then authorized to open a letter of credit°
In addition to quantitative regulations, cotton imports
are subjected to customs duties - I0 percent ad valorem and a
10 percent sales tax over 25 percent mark-up. These rates
represent an almost 24 percent implicit tariff on imported
cotton. Since there are no sales taxes imposed on domestically
produced raw cotton (lint), this rate can be also interpreted as
'a measure of nominal protection on cotton lint production° As
will be shown in the next section_ however, this rate under-
estimates the incnetive to domestic cotton seed production.
Recently, the expansion and modernization of the textile in-
dustry was given a considerable boost. The government, in pus h-
ing its export-orientation program for the generation of foreizn
exchange , is encouraging the country's millers to_:retire old
equipment in response to tachnology development and to meet
the mbdern finishes desired for exports. To give effect to
this program, the BOI, through the provision of Incnentive Act
6135 implemented since 1979, _ives incentives to new textile
mills by allowing them to import equipment and machinery free
of duty and taxes for a period of 7 years from the date of re-
gistrati_, Starting 1981_ however, this incnetive is tied with12
another government policy - a rational program which
requires textile mills to export at least 30 percent of their
produce.
II. STRUCTURE OF INCENTIVES IN THE COTTON INDUSTRY
Nominal and Effective Protection
Since the tradable commodity is raw cotton (lint) and not
seedcotton_ the estimation of nominal protection on cotton farm-
ers' output starts with the determination of overall (total)
nom hal protection to the cotton industry, i.eo_ to seedcotton
production and to processing which is a mononoly of the Philip-
pine Cotton Corporation, This total protection can be best
measured by direct price comparison between domestic and border
prices evaluated a t a comparable in the marketing chain.
However, because of the marked quality difference between cotton
imports and domestic production the border price of raw cotton
was correspondingly adjusted in an attemp to make domestic and
border prices directly comparable. The adjustment procedure is
discussed in Appendix Ao
The impact of government polieies_ notably trade and fiscal
policies, measured by these price comparisons_ was H as expected_
favorably to the cotton industry as a whole (Table 5). Total
nominal protection rate averaged 28 percent during the 1975-8113
period. This figure was somewhat close to an independent estimate
(24 percent) based on tariff and indirect taxes. Given the quan-
titative import restrictions (quota allocation) on raw cotton, how-
ever, the first estimate (by price comparison) is preferred and is
used for luther analysis since the latter (by legislated rates)
fails to capture the effect of _his form of trade restriction.
From the total nominal protection conferred by policy on the
cotton industry, the nominal protectinn to cotton farmers for the
production of seedcotton was estimated indirectly. Briefly, the
estimation method consists of two stages. First, the implicit pro-
tection to processing was eliminated by replacing PCC's processing
cost with the average processing cost of eleven major cotton pro-
ducing countries. The implicit assumption was that this average
is a close approxiation of the cost of efficient and protection-
free processing. Second, this processin_ cost was added to the
lint price equivalent of seedcotton price actually received by farm-
ers and the t6tal, termed farm price in lint equivalent, was com-
pared with the border price as in the estimation of total nominal
protection rate. Details ofthe estimation procedure are also dis-
cussed in Appendix A.
These estimates revealed that the nominal protection rate on
seedcotton production was negative averaging- 7 percent during
the 1975-81 period. What this tends to show is that the producer's out-
put was, generally_ not protected, i.e., not conferred with incentives,14
by price policy set by PCC, but rather penalized. Domestic pro-
ducer prices were pegged, on the average, 7percent below compa-
rable world prices°
The nominal protection rate measure, h_wever, does not com-
pletely capture the impact of all price policies on the incentive
structure in seedcotton production. In addition to price policy
on output, farmers' _incentives also depend on the price of inputs
which are likewise affected by various policy measures_ Thus, the
effective protection rate is a more relevant measure than the
nominal rate.
Because the implicit tariffs on tradable inputs used in cotton
production were substantially higher than L the nominal protection
rate on farmers' output, the effective protection rate was generally
lower than the nominal protection rate (Table 6)° Over the seven-
year period considered, EPR averaged - 12 percent, ioeo, returns to
domestic primary factors (domestic value added) were lower by 12
percen_ as a result of the implicit tariffs on outputs and inputs.
In other words, returns to these factors were penalized by the
protection system.
So far, no mention has been made of the incentive impact of
the government's agricultural credit policy and its funding of
agricultural extension, research and development, and other services.
As mentioned earlier, the national cotton development program has15
had an accompnying supervised cr_di£_: package and a pool of research
and extension support. Only the average impact of intervention on
production credit, however, has been estimated here to determine
the extent to which the penalty by price policy on cotton
has been offset by the interest rate subsidy on agricultural credit.
The interest rate differential between agricultural loans and
the rest of the economy had tended to be about 6 percentage points
during bhe seventies (David, 1981)o Consequently, the cost of
capital in agriculture was about 6 percent lower than in the non-
agricultural sector° In the present paper, this subsidy, when ex-
pressed as a proportion of free-trade value added, ranged from 2 to
5 percent during the 1975-81.
_he incentive impact of credit subsidy on the overall protect-
ion to farm cotton production did not fully offset the penalty
imposed, by price policy on tradsble inputs and output, the average
effective protection rate durins the period under consideration
being raised only from -12 percent to -9 percent as a result of
the credit subsidy.
The protection rate would be still lower when the disincentive
effect of the overvalued domestic currency relative to foreign ex-
change is accounted for in the measure, AS mentioned elsewhere,
the protection system itself makes domestic currency overvalued
relative to foreign exchange. Medalla (1979) estimated a 32 percent
undervaluation of foreign exchange. Thus, the net EPR is less than
that indicated in the foregoing measure,i.e., an average of-2516
percent during the 1975-81 period. It should be noted_ however_
that the correction for overvaluation of domestic currency has a
neutral effect on all traded goods industries in the agricultural
sector and the geDeral e=onomy. Thus, the relative ranking of
cotton production would not change before and after the correction
for currency overvaluation.
Synthesis on Incentive Structure
Th_;foregoing analysis has shown that despite a clear positive
nominal protection conferred by price policy on raw cotton, the
protection on cotton farmers' output and value added tended to be
negative indicating that cotton farmers have been penalized by
the governmet's price policy. This does not necessary mean,
howeve9 that the protection to the cotton industry accrued totally
to the processing sector, i.e_, to PCCo A considered proportion of
PCC's profit was apparently to supplement the budget for agri-
cultural extension and research and development_ Thus9 a part of
the overall protection to the industry was ultimately channeled
down to cotton farmers in the form of government services. If the
impact of these servcies to domestic value added could be reasonably
quantified and incorporated in the effective protection m_asure,
the picture of'Dverall protection recieved by cotton farmers might
have to be modified. It is not expected_ bowever, that the position
of the cotton crop in the protection-pena)%-y scale of agricult_:ral17
crops will be markedly altered. Other agricultural crops are also
receiving similar government services which may likewise increase
the protection on these crops.
The estimated protection rates on seedcotton were generally
lower than those conferred by price policy on food crops, but higher
than those on export crops (Table 7).5 Durin_ the seventies, nomi-
nal protection rates on food and export crops were, on the average,
-3 and -15 percent, respectively. Considerin_ that export crops,
notably sugar and:_tohacco, are the predominant slternativesof
farmers in the choice for second crops in most cotton-growing areas,
it may be less disheartening to observe a nominal penalty on cotton
farmers' output since the penalty imposed by price policy on export
crops ismore severe. However, considerin_ that cotton is a rela-
tively new agricultural crop in farmers cropping systems, the
slight output protection advantage of this•crop r_lative to export
crops may be easily outweighed by greater risk and uncertainly per-
eeived in shifting to a new crop. More6ver, there is _= income
distribution questions that should not be ignored. Why should these
farmers' incomes be reduced substantially below what a free market
would offer? Also, in the longer-Tun as the national cotton develop-
ment program expands to other targeted areas wh_re food crops are
mostly grown as second crops, a more favorable price policy on
5
This refers to nominal rates of protection, but as tradable
inputs represent only a small proportion of production costs a_d
valus of output in crop production, it is likely that the ranking
of agricultural crops would be roughly similar with the use of either
-_"_e-v_*_ev_e_ure of _rotection.
I18
cotton may be necessary to induce farmers to plant cotton.
Relative to the manufacturing sector which received an effect-
ive Drotection from government policies of about 44 percent during
the seventies, the protection conferred on the cotton industry was
very low. Thus, government pricing policies seem not to be de-
signed to attract resources to the cotton industry in competition
with manufacturing industries. If this discrepancy centinues in
the long-run, it may be that the government would increasingly
have to bear the burden of financing the cotton program.
III. STRUCTURE OF COF]_4RATIVE ABVAN_AGE IN THE
As raised earlier, one principal issue in the national move,
J
to co_ner_ialize cotton production in the country is the relative
competitiveness of domestically produced as compared to imported
cotton. Put in i_s proper per_ective, the issue is, would the
economy benefit from substitutigng domestic for imported cotton
i.e., would the benefits outweigh domestic cost of production?
THe analysis is centered on the "ex post" domeeti_ resource cost
(DRC) concept which meanures the value of domestic resources
evaluated at social opportunity cost, used in saving a unit of
foreigh exchange via local cotton production.
For "input-output coefficient at the farmers' fields, the
present paper made use of compara£ive input, output and financial
farm survey data for cotton and major alternative crops, available19
at the Special Studies Division, Ministry of Agriculture, Some
description features of these surveys are shown in Table 8. These
data wete supplemented by production statistics from the Cottm
Research and Development Institute, Philippine Cotton Corporation
and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Ministry of Agrlculture.
The !ndustry DRC
Exluding land rent, the average seedcotton production comts
(evaluated at market prices) for the period considered are shown in
Table 9. On a per-hectare basis production costs ranged _2, 131
in 1976 to _5,044 in 1981. Labor and operating capital costs in 1981
reanched unprecedentedlevels, the increases in the former mainly re-
sulting from increased physical labor inputs _ther than increased
market wages.
The allocati6n, of the above costs to domastic and fooeigh
6
sources is presented in Table I0 . Together with labor,cost, land
rental, which was taken to be 25 percent of the valu_ of pzoductlon
6
The genral methodology followed on the allocation of costs
to domestic, foreign and tax sources was that outlined in the ZEPAD
Pzo_ect. BriefEy, the allocation process took into account the
historical origin (source) of tradable inputs, whether they were
fully or partially imported.20
7
in tobacco _ the best alternative of cotton in present cotton-
growing areas,was allocated fully to domestic cost.
As mentioned earlier, processing (ginning) of seedcotton into
cotton lint and marketing operating are monopolies of the Philip-
pine Cotton Corporation. In the past, its yearly average net ginning
costs, calculated, as shown in Table ii, by deducting the value of
ginning by products (agricultural and industrial seeds) from total
ginning costs, fluctuated drastically4 This resulted m_inly from
large excess capacity in some years. During the seventies, for
example actual use ranged from only 8 to 35 percent of rated capa-
cities in contrast to an average utilization rate of 67 percent
in the early eighties. The same explanation can be made about
the observed annual fluctuation in average marketing cost.
The ¢ountry'_ relative comparative advantage in cotton lint
production did not show a progressive trend° Instead of an expected
decline in domestic resource cost from 1975 onward, the study Rave
surp_i_results with industry DRC generally escalating from
_8,74/US$ in 1975 to _15,90/US$ in 1978 (Table 22). What gave
rise to these results was the general marked decline in average
7
A large proportion of the farm respondents used in the present
study were share-tenants and /or Dart-ownerso From crop year 1975-76
to 1977-28, it was about 59 percent_ crop year 1978-79 to 1980-$I, 52
percent. For these farms, the most common pra¢t±ce was the 75-25
sharing system. (i.eo, seven-five percent of the farm produce going
to the farmer cultivator and 25 percent to the landowner, the latter
not sharing production costs). From this observation it was deemed_
appropriate to measure the opportunity cost of land through the pre'
vailing share rent.21
raw cotton yield in the survey data from 0_37/ha in 1975, when
the co=ton program was first introduced, to 0.24 mr/ha in !:978 (or
equivalently, from 1.0 mr/ha to 0.66 mr/ha of seedcotton, respect-
8
ively). This alone had largely contributed to spiralling product-
' ion cost per unit of raw cottonproduced in the country from 1975
to 1978o 9 Compared with the shadow price of foreign exchange,
however, the DRCs, except for 1978, were still relatively lower,
though only slightly, indicating that the value of domestic re-
sources so used in cotton production was less than the average
amount of domestic resources required to earn one dollar (the
domestic cost of foreign exchange).
}_wever, an apparently better picture of the relative effi-
ciency of the industry in saving a unit of foreign exchange appeared
during the last two years considered. At this time, the study
showed industry DRCs falling substantially below the shadow ex-
change rate, clearly indicating a strong comparative advantage
position for the country in raw cotton production. As in the
above case, the relatively low DRCs during this period were
8Coincldentally or not, this was also the general trend in
the actual national performance of the cotton development program.
From a seedcotton yield of 1.24 mr/ha in 1975, the average dropped
to 0.54 mt/ha in 1978. From hereon to 1980, average yield showed
a reversal trend reaching 0°97 mr/ha in 1980 but subsequently dec-
lined to 0,72 mr/ha the following year°
91t should be apparent that the drastic increase in DRC in
1978 was also partly contributed by an almost twofold jump in
ginning and marketing costs incurred by PCC relative to that in
the previous year.22
largely explained by comparatively high average raw cotton yield
estimated from the survey data. Though production costs on a per-
hectare basis increased significantly from previous years as shown
earlier, the remarkable increase in average raw cotton yield in
1980 and 1981 was enough to push production cost per metric ton
of lint to comparable levels from previous years_ This low per-
unit production cost was strongly reinforced by more favorable
world market price (CIF) of raw cotton during the last two years
The Seedcotton DRC
The industry DRC does not give a clear picture of comparative
advantage in seedcotton production. Though it has been stated that
fluctuations in seedcotton yield largely contributed to the change
in the industry DRCs over time, it should be apparent that the state
of efficiency or inefficiency in processing and marketing did like-
wise exert a consSderable influence on overall comparative advan-
tage_ What is needed therefore is a measure of actual comparative
advantage in seedcotton production that is free from the influence
of changing cost parameters in processing and marketing°
However_ because seedcotton is not tradable_ and thus, does
not have an actual (observed) world market value, the DRC in
seedcotton production was estimated indirectly. First, the implicit
border value of seedcotton was estimated by deflating the seed-
cotton price actually received by cotton farmers with the nominal23
protection rate as estimated in the preceeeding section° Then
the DRC in seedcotton production was calculated as in the indus-
try case. The results_ shown in Table 13_ indicated that seed-
cotton DRCs were generally lower than industry DRCs_ implying
that the generally higher DRCs in the industry compared to those
in seedcotton production were due to relatively less efficient
processing. Since the inudstry was in effect a weighted average
of implicit DRCs in processing and seedcotton production_ it
would be expected that the DRCs in processing would be higher
than the industry DRCs.
To evaluate the sensitivity of seedcotton DRCs to the assumpt-
ions implicit in the calculation and to changes in the price
structure cf inputs and output_ an attempt was made to calculate
elasticities for the different parameters° As commonly defined,
an elasticity represents a percent ch_ng_ in DRC with respect to
a given percent change in a specified parameter_ all other factors
held constant° The results of the exercise are summarized in
Table 14o DRCs were relatively insensitive to the opportunity
costa of land, labor_ capital, fertilizer_ and insecticide but
were highly sensitive to yield and implicit border price of
output. Since the seedcotton yield influences the DRC in exactly
the same nmgnitude as that of the implicit border price, only
yield is given a further examination.24
Except for some years_ average seedcotton yields used in
the base estimates were much above the national average yield°
This was apparently true in 1980 and 1981 when the survey data
gave more than 1o5 mr/ha of seedcotton, or 88 percent higher than
the national average yield of 0°8 mr/ha during the same period_
However, these yield levels are easily attainable in areas ade-
quate irrigation_ Moreover, if the recommended technology is
properly follwed, seedcotton yield ranging from 1o5 to over 5 mr/
ha are not all farfetched, as demonstrated by model cotton grow-
ers selected annually in each province and to more recent data
i0
from Mindanaoo
To show the range of seedcotton yield levels within which
the country could have a comparative advantages critical mini-
mum seedcotton yields were estimated_ !I In this exercise, average
seedcotton production cost per hectare was assumed constant as
lOFor crop year 1981-82, Mindanao farmers accounting for 5
percent of national production obtained an average yield of 1o5
mr/ha compared to Luzon (38% of production) and Visayas (11% pro-
duction) farmers with 0.8 and 0°9 mt/ha yields, respectively°
llcritical minimum seedcotton yield is defined as that yield
level at which the ratio of DRC to shadow exchange rate (SER)
equals to unity, Joe., the country nether losses nor gains in
domestic cotton production. Seedcotton yield below the critical
minimum would mean a loss to the society, local production being
more costly than importation, or vice versa.25
given in the farm survey and as used in the base estimates° The
results, presented in Figure 3, showed that while estimates from
1975 to 1979 were generally close to critical minimum yields, seed-
cotton yileds estimated in 1980 and 1981 would have to decrease
more than 45 and 40 percent, respectively_ for the country to
lose its comparative advantage in cotton production. Incidentally_
estimated critical minimum seedcotton yields for the last two years
were about 20 percent lower than the average levels targeted by
the national cotton development program at the self-sufficiency
stage of the industry's development,
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The paper has explicitly shown that despite the _avorable
protection conferred by government policies on the cotten indus-
try, the farmers were penalized even by those policies set by
the Philippine Cotton Corporation, the nations' implementing
arm of the national cotton development program° It also dis-
closed that the country exhibited a comparative advantage in
local cotton productiOn_ underscoring the industryVs relative
efficiency in ssving foreign exchange for the economy.
Since its inception, PCC has been giving a considerable
focus on cotton research and development and agricultural exten-
sion as a way of enhancing the cotton industry's performance°
Part of the protection conferred by government policies on PCCVs26
processing and marketing operations is used to supplement the
budget for these activities° While it can be viewed that these
activities are ultimately for the benefit of farmers, it should
be also noted that the incidence of this incentive is necessarily
a long run one° In the short run, for the national cotton prog-
ram tohold its modest growth pace of recent years, it is impe-
rative that a larger proportion, if not all, of the total protect-
ion the industry is receiving from government policies should be
shifted to farmers by instituting price policies that are more
favorable to farmers. In this way, the country can better fully
exploit its comparative advantage in domestic cotton production.
As the relative competititveness of the crop with respect to tra-
ditional alternative crops stabilizes in the longer-run, this
protection may need to be gradually withdrawn and allow the crop
to compete in the market°
One qualifying points needs to be stressed here° While it
was explicitly stated that there is an economic ground for cotton
expansion in Philippine agriculture, the study does not suggest
that economic efficiency is the only consideration of policy in
the choice of crop for agricultural promotion or penalization.
Other factors like employment, income distribution, concentration
of economic power and the.socio-political implications of the
choice to the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors of the
society, are obviously considered in policy decisions.27
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Table I_ Sources of raw cotton (lint) imports, 1963-80.
Country of Origin 1963- 1966_ 1971_- 1976-
65 70 75 80
Percent of total quantity
United States 73.6 75°3 99,0 79.0
Mexico 15.1 15o6 0°4 3,4
Brazil 5.5 0.7 0°3 0.i
Nicaragua 2°3 Io_I a 2°5
Guatemala 0.5 1.5 - 1.7
United Ara_ Republic 0.2 0.4 0_3 a
Sudan 0.I 0°9 - 0.2
Pakistan - - - 3°5
Israel - - - 2.5
USSR - - - 1o6
India 0.3 a - I.I
Others 2_4 3°7 - 4.4
Total I00.0 I00.0 I00o0 i00.0
Source of basic data_ Foreign Trade Statistics of the Philippine,
National Census and Statistics Office.
aLess than 0oi _ercent.2o
Table 2. Domestic production of raw cotton (lint) and share _o total
supply 1975-81








1981 4,594 D 13o6b
-4
Source= Production _ata from Philippine Cotton Cornorationo
aTotal suppl_ is defined as import plus produetion_
bEstimate.






















Source: Philippine Cotton Corporation.30
Table 4_ Loans granted for the cotton supervised credit financing
program, 1975-81
Total Average Loan Per
Year Loan
(_I000) Farmer Hectare Metric ton Repayment of raw cotton Rate
(_) (_) (_) (_)
1975 366 851 1,887 3,773 98
1976 19336 928 1,641 7,591 75
1977 3,565 635 1,270 8,158 73
1978 4,675 535 1,478 7_552 77
1979 5,979 995 1,946 7,455 80
1980 15,988 1,161 2,132 5,796 91
1981 43,887 2,001 2,581 9,553 noa.
Source: Philippine Cotton Corporation.31
Table 5o Trends in farm price, ex-warehouse price ,border Drice,
and nominal protection rates on the cotton industry , 1975-81
Farm Price Domestic Border d Nominal Total Nomi-
Year In seed_ In lint Ex-Warehouse Protection nal Prote_t-
Cotton equivalent b Price c Price Rate e ion Rate _'
(_/mt) (_/mt) (_/mt) (_/mt) ( % ) ( % ) i
1975 3,500 10,549 13,000 11,431 -8 14
1976 3,850 11,315 13,000 11,297 0 15
1977 4,000 11,771 15,000 13,641 -14 i0
1978 4,000 11,811 15,000 11,166 6 34
1979 4_000 Ii_85i 16,500 ii_854 0 39
1980 4,400 12,982 19_000 13,313 -2 43
1981 4,450 13,167 18,150 15,121 i_13 20
Weighted average, 1975-81 g -7 28
Legislated rate h 24
aprice actually received by farmers.
bLint price equivalent of seedcotton price plus efficient cost of
converting seedc_tton to cotton lint and marketing the product computed
as shown in ADpendix Ao
CSelling price of cotton lint to textile millers by the Philippine
Cotton Corporation.
d
Average CIF Value for imported raw cotton (lint)_ adjusted for
quality differential domestically produced and imported raw
cotton.
e
Percentage difference of farm price (in lint equivalent) to border
price,
f
Percentage difference of domestic ex-warehouse price to border
price°
g
W_ighted by total raw cotton production in each year_
h
Based on existing tariff rates for imported raw cotton: 10% ad
valorem and a 10% sales tax over 25% mark-upo32
Table 6. Estimates of effective protection rates on cotton
production, 1975-810
Effective Ratio of Credit Effective Pro-
Year Protection Subsidy to Free- tection Rate
Rate TRade Value Added with Credit
(%) Subsidy (%)
1975 -14 .02 -12
1976 - 4 .05 i
1977 -21 °04 -17
1978 1 °05 6
1979 -4 °04 0
1980 -6 .03 -3
1981 -19 _04 -5
Weighted average_
1975-81 a -12 -9
a
Weighted by total raw cotton production in each year°33
Table 7o Comparison of protection rates on cotton vis-a-vis
other crops and between the cotton industry and the
manufacturing sector, 1970s and early 1980so
Item Protection Measure Percent
Cotton industry a Total nominal protection rate 28
Seedcotton Nominal protection rate -7
Effective protection rate -12
Effective protection rate with
b credit subsidy -9
Food Crops Nominal protection rate
Rice 3
Corn 3
Other food crops 0
b
Export crops Nominal protection rate
Sugar -21
Copra -24
Other export crops -4
Manufacturing se_tor c Effective protection rate 44
a Includes seed cotton production and processing.
bBased on price comparisen between domestic and border prices as
estimated in David, C_C. " Impact of Price Intervention Policies on
Agricultural Incentives in the Philippines," paper presented at the
Second Western Pacific Food Trade Workshop Kartika Chandia Hotel,
Jakarta, August 22-23,1982.
CBased on legislated rates as shown in Tan_ No "The Structure
of Protection and Resource Flows in the Philippines _, in Bautista, R.
Jo Power and Associates_ Industrial PromOtion Policies in the
Philippines_, Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 1979o..... _Tabie 8. Some--de_scriptivJ:f_eatur-_-_ of the SSD_'_-_IMa * farm surveys on co--6_n_d'_l _, . -
Title Crop Year Area Covered Total Number of Farm Respondsnt
Covered For all crops For cotton
Io Comparative Input, Output,
and Finannial Data for Virginia
_..:Tobacco,.Pelay,Mongo, Corn a
and Cotton 1974-75 llocos Reg on 300 60
2oComparative Input, Output and
Financial Data for Palay, Corn,
Mongo, Virginia Tobacco and
Cotton 1975-76 llocos Region 515 i00
3. Comparative Input, Output and
Financial Data for Mongo, Cotton
pa!ay, Virginia Tobacco andCorn 1976-77 .llocos Region 500 180
4. Comparative Input, Output and
Financial Data for Cotton, Corn
Palay, Mongo, Virginal Tobacco,
and Burley Tobhcco 1977-78 llocos Region 554 91
5o Comparative Input, Output and llocos Region,
Financial Data for Cotton, Palay Tarlac,
Burley Tabacco, Virginia Tobacco_._ Nueva Ecija
ans Native Tobacco 1978-79 515 304
6. Comparative Input, Output and llocos Region
Financial Bata for Cotton, Palay, Tarlac, Nueva
Burely Tobacco, Virginia Tobacco, Ecija, and
and Native Tobacco 1979-80 Cagayan 426 183
7. Cost Involved in the Domestic
Production of Agri-based Import
Substitutes- Cotton 1980-81 llocos Region - 201
_5"
*aSpe, ei_l_: ,ff._di.es.,._'S_:%..-.M_i/_Lrr_._..og ._-gi__.._ ,.... . .
Includes the pr_ineesof Ilocos Norte, Ilecos Sur, La Union, and Pangasinan,35
]able 9. Average costs of seed_otton production, llocos Region*, 1975-81
Year Labor a CapitalbService Operating Interest on
Cost Cost Capit_ Pre-_arvest Other. Total
Cost c Cost Costs e
Besos per Hectare
]975 I_013 240 1,178 139 41 29611
]976 789 308 " 892 109 33 2,131
1977 1,207 609 876 135 44 2987]
1978 934 518 -"'."729 115 36 2,332
1979 1,274 614 724 125 61 2,798
19[_0 19253 683 1,239 212 " 75 3,462
1°81 1,987 949 1,628 304 176 59044
* Except for 1979 and 1980 which also include Nueva Ecija9 Tarlac and Cagayano
alncludes hired labor costs and imputed v_lues of operator9 family and exchange labor.
blncludes depreciation and interest cost of fixed capital assets other than lando
Clncludes fertilizer, insecticides and seeds°
dAt 15% per .annnm_ app_rtio_ed..as.origi_al- cost._7'._%for._6.month_.._-.
e Unclides containers, food for hired and exchange labom_ and tranpportation costs°36
Table I0. Domestic and foreign cost in seedcotton production, Ilocos Region _, 1975-81.
Source of Cost 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Domestic
Lan_ rent 1,4!5 735 1,169 I,_46 988 1,695 1,241
Labor cost 1.013 789 1,207 934 1,274 1,253 1,987
Capital service cost 211 274 446 342 419 442 544
Ope_ating capital cost 350 287 247 247 247 369 462
,-_u_res_ on_preha_vest
cost 139 I_9 135 115 125 212 304
Oth_:r costs 41 33 44 36 61 75 176
Sub-total 3,169 2,227 3,24_ 3,120 3,114 4,046 4,714
Foreign
Capital service cost 22 25 120 130 146 179 300
Operating capital cost 661 485 499 387 387 701 938
Su_-total 683 510 619 517 533 880 1,238
Totml Iomsstic and
Foreign costs 3,852 2,737 3_867 3,637 3,647 4,926 5,952
eExcept for 1979 and 1980 which also include Nueva Ecija, Tarlac and Cagayan.37
Table 11. Estimates of ginning and _.erketing costs in cotton production, Philippines. 1975-81.
Item 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
GinnYng Cost
Total ggnning cost a 4,480 d 5,442 4,511 5,298 4,993 2,159 3,570 d
Less: V_lue of ginning d
b_-products 2,280q 3,182 2,745 1,643 2,271 1,255 1,760_
Net ginting cost 2,200 d 1,630 1,766 3,655 2,722 904 1,RIO e
All¢cated to:
Domestic 1,936 1,434 1,554 3,216 2,395 795 1,592
Foreign 220 163 177 365 272 90 181
Tax 44 33 35 73 54 18 36
Mm-keti_g Cost c 790d 883 1,670 2,345 440 486 460 d
Sourc_ of basic data: PCC Financial Statements.
aApproximated cost of converting seedcotton to cotton lint. Includes expenses for direct
labor, manufacturing overhaed, and administrative charges.
blncludes value of industrial seeds exported to Japan and agricultural seeds for planting
materials.
Clncludes picking up seedcotton from the farm to ginnery and transportation cotton lint to textilemillers.
dEstima_e.,,_.Table 12. Summary of domestic resource cost components in cotton lint production, Ilocos Region*, 1975-81.
Average Domestic Cost v 'Foreign Cost',- Average Domestic
Yield ._.__, -.:/_ CIF Resource
Year Lint a _roduction Ginning b Marketing Production Ginning _ Value c Cost Comparative
(rot/ha) (Fha) (_/mt) (F/mr) (F/ha (_/ha) (US$/mt) ( _/US$ Advantage
1975 0.37 3,169 1,936 790 683 220 1,577 8.74 0.90
1976 0.26 2,227 1,434 883 510 163 1,518 8.83 0.89
1977 0.28 3,248 1,554 1,670 619 177 1,843 9.73 0.98
1978 0.24 3,120 3,216 2,435 517 365 1,515 15.90 1.61
1979 0.31 3,114 2,395 440 533 272 1,606 9.64 0.97
1980 0.58 4,046 795 486 880 90 1,773 5.30 0.53
1981 0.57 4,714 1,592 460 1,238 181 1,914 6.39 0.60
Weighted Average, 1975-81 d 7.22 0.71
_Except for 1979 and 1980 which also include Nueva Ecija, Tarlac and Cagayan.
abased on a recavery rate of 37% of seedcotton.
bNet of value of ginning by-products (industrial and agricultural seeds).
CAdjusted for quality differen£_al between domestically produced and imported cotton lint.
dweighted by total raw cotton production in each year,
eRatio of domestic resource cost to shadow exchange rate.39
Table 13. Summary of domestic resource cost tom ponents in seedcotton production, llocos Region _,
1975-81.
Seedcotton Production Cost Implicit Dome=tic Comparativ- Yield Domestic Foreign Border Value a Resource _st
Year (mr/ha) (P/ha) (P/ha) (US$/mt) _/US $) Advantage
1975 1.00 3,169 683 525 7.36 0.76
1976 0.71 2,227 510 517 7.46 0.75
1977 0.75 3,248 619 628 8.38 0.84
1978 0.66 3,120 517 512 11.65 1.I8
1979 0.85 3,114 533 542 8.02 0.81
1980 1.57 4,046 880 598 4.92 0.49
1981 1.55 4,714 1,238 647 5.57 0.53
Weighted average, 1975-81 c 6.19 0.61
*Except for 1979 and 1980 which also include Nueva Ecija, Tarlac and Cagayan.
aseedcotton price deflated by nominal protection rate on seedcotton, converted at official
exchange rate.
bThe ratio of domestic resource cost to shadow exchange rate.
CWei_hted by total seedcotton production in each year.40
Table 14. Elasticity of DRC coefficient in seedcotton production with respect to stated perameter,
llocesRegion* 1975-81,
Parameter
Land rent Labor cost Capital Fertilizer Insecticide Implicit Year
year service cost cost cost border price
1975 0.395 0.268 0.022 0,058 0o129 -1,255 -1,255
1976 0o331 0°356 0.136 0.135 0o177 -1.213 -1.213
1977 0.422 0.4B_ 0,240 0,128 0.220 -1.141 -1.141
1978 0.479 0o314 0.444 0,107 O.169 -io231 -I,231
1979 0,266 0.358 0.133 0,.47 0.045 -1,222 -1.222
1980 0o501 0,392 0.219 0.176 0.178 -1.048 -1.048
1981 0°284 0°443 0,179 0.128 0.139 -I.150 -I.150
*Except for 1979 and 1980 which also include Nueva Ecija, Tarlac and Cagayan,414244
APPENDIX A
ESTIMATION OF BORDER AND FARM PRICE OF FARM COTTON
This note presents the details of the adjustment done in the
estimation of appropriation border and domestic producer prices. Clearly,
this adjustments was done to make domestic and border prices directly
comparable, ioe._ to net out the price differential between domestic
and border prices due to quality difference between imports and
local production. Any wedge between the two prices can then be
solely attricbuted to price-distorting govermemt policies.
Withou_ marked quality difference between imports and local
production, the domestic price of raw cotton sold by PCC to textile
millers should be directly ¢omparabl_: toborder price, represamted
by average CIF converted at official exchange rate. However, this
was not so during the p_miod considered in the study. While domes-
tic production was mostly medium staple (about 86 percent), imports
were mostly short staple (60 percent). This was also tru in terms
of lint grades: local production were mostly middling and strict
middling in contract to imports whiEh were mostly low and strict
low middling. Thus, a noticeable higher price on domestic product-
ion relative toborder price of import was presumably due to the
higher quality of the former.
To correct for this discrepancy, border prices were corres-
pondingly adjusted upward. The general adjustment factor)l_14)
was taken as the average price ratio (1976-81) of two American45
lint grades_ Memhis Terr. SM 1-1/16" and Orleans/Texas M i".
The former was more or less comparable to the quality of local
productlon_ the latter, to tD_t of imports°
Price comparison between farm and border prices involved more
complication than that above. Since farmers _ output is not tradable,
its price is not directly comparable to that of tradable lint. In
this paper_ for both prices to be comparable_ seedcotton price was
translated in terms of its lint price equivalent and added to it
processing (ginning) cost. Any wedge between domestic producer and
border prices measured at a comparable point in the marketing chain
was then attributed_ as in above_ to price-distorting government
policies. The problem, however, was that of processing cost to
quote. Since the net protection conferred by government policies
to cotton farmers was the concern of the study_ PCC_s processing
cost could not be used since this cost apparently included the
effects of whatever protection conferred to and inefficiency
that existed in processing. The alternative was to replac_
PCC's processing cost with the average processing cost of eleven
major cotton-produclng countries. The implicit assumption was
that this average was a close approximation of the cost of effi-
cient and protection-free processing. The estimates are su_n_marized
in Appendix Table io46
Appendix Table i. Estimates of farm price of raw cotton (lin),
1975-81.
Item 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Price received by
farmers for seed-
cotton 3.50 3.85 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.40 4.45
Price equivalent
in cotton linta 9.46 10.40 10.81 i0o8% 10.8] 11.89 12.03
Plus: . .
_rocessxng ano b
marketing costs 1.09 0.91 0.96 1.00 1.04 1.09 1.14
Farm price of raw
¢otto_ 10.55 11.31 11.77 11.81 11.85 12.98 13.17
Source of basic data: Philippine Cotton Corporation
World Cotton Statistics
abased on a recovery rate of 37%°
bAverage of eleven major cotton-producing countries. This rep=
resents the approximated cost of protection-free and efficient proces-
sing (ginning) and marketing.